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Data loss due to integrity attacks or malfunction constitutes a principal concern in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The present
paper introduces a novel data loss/modification detection and recovery scheme in this context. Both elements, detection and data
recovery, rely on amultivariate statistical analysis approach that exploits spatial density, a common feature in network environments
such as WSNs. To evaluate the proposal, we consider WSN scenarios based on temperature sensors, both simulated and real.
Furthermore, we consider three different routing algorithms, showing the strong interplay among (a) the routing strategy, (b) the
negative effect of data loss on the network performance, and (c) the data recovering capability of the approach. We also introduce
a novel data arrangement method to exploit the spatial correlation among the sensors in a more efficient manner. In this data
arrangement, we only consider the nearest nodes to a given affected sensor, improving the data recovery performance up to 99%.
According to the results, the proposed mechanisms based onmultivariate techniques improve the robustness ofWSNs against data
loss.
1. Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a (structured or not)
group of hundreds or even thousands of sensor devices
intended to monitor a given area or region by measuring one
or more physical variables [1]. Typically, a central unit (CU)
exists to gather and analyze the data generated by the sensors.
The data collected by the sensors can be transmitted to the
CU either directly or through the collaboration of several of
the devices in the network using multihop routing. It may
also be useful to arrange the sensors in groups (clusters) for
data aggregation, so that the manager node in the cluster is
responsible for collecting and sending the data to the CU.
Data aggregation reduces the energy consumption, which is
an attractive goal for this kind of networks.
There are two principal WSN uses: monitoring and
tracking. In both cases, WSNs can be applied in various
fields, including themilitary, medical, and/or industrial fields
[2]. These networks are usually assumed to contain fixed
nodes. However, providing nodes with mobility has several
advantages in terms of connectivity, cost, reliability, and
energetic efficiency [3].
Deploying monitoring mechanisms in WSNs to
strengthen the services provided is encouraged. This is
especially true in hostile environments like military actions,
crisis management, and disaster detection and recovery,
where data loss or data modification can lead to disastrous
consequences. These monitoring mechanisms are especially
challenged by malicious data modification attacks, such as
the so-called data tampering, environmental tampering, or
tampering attack [4, 5].
In the present work, we assess the application of mul-
tivariate analysis techniques for WSN monitoring and data
recovery. Multivariate techniques fit well when there exists a
high temporal and spatial correlation between the variables
considered, which is a common feature in WSNs. The
monitoring scheme is aimed at finding anomalous records.
Subsequently, the diagnosis of these anomalies can show
whether the anomaly is due to an actual reading or due to
data loss/modification. In the event of data loss/modification,
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the recovery scheme is responsible for the estimation of the
missed data. To monitor and detect anomalies in the system
behavior, multivariate statistical process control (MSPC)
based on principal component analysis (PCA) [6, 7] and
partial least squares (PLS) [8, 9] is used. To recover lost data,
trimmed scores regression (TSR) [10, 11] using both PCA- and
PLS-based models (TSR-PCA and TSR-PLS) is employed. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that MSPC,
PLS, and TSR are used in the context of WSNs.
A relevant issue when applying multivariate techniques
is the data arrangement, that is, the way collected data
are organized to make the most of a multivariate model.
This matter has been widely studied in fields like statistical
monitoring, process control, or image processing and has a
significant impact depending on the application at hand. We
evaluate the impact of data arrangement on the recovery of
lost data and show that the recovery performance can be
improved by merely rearranging the data in a certain way.
Finally, we show that the routing algorithm chosen for
multihop retransmissions has a relevant influence on the
data loss/modification impact on network performance. We
analyze three routing scenarios to evidence the consequences
on the number of sensors affected depending on both the
routing algorithm used and the location of the specific sensor
under tampering attack or malfunction. Afterwards, we test
the performance of our system and show how to detect and
recover the original values of the affected sensors through the
previously mentioned multivariate techniques.
In summary, we make three main contributions in this
work:
(i) The assessment of a multivariate statistical-based
response scheme to detect data loss/modification and
recover missing data.
(ii) The deployment of a neighborhood-based data impu-
tation scheme through a local data arrangement to
take advantage of the higher correlation between
closer sensors.
(iii) The analysis of how the underlying multihop routing
algorithm modifies the consequences of the data
tampering attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents some relevant works related to the subject under
study. Section 3 discusses the fundamentals of the multi-
variate analysis techniques used in the present work, and
Section 4 introduces their use in missing data recovery.
Section 5 describes two different methods to arrange the
original data for modeling and the importance of this choice
depending on the system purposes. Section 6 presents a
simulation scenario and the associated recovery performance
results. Section 7 illustrates a procedure to improve the results
obtained using local models in order to exploit the high
correlation between close sensors. In Section 8, a real WSN
scenario is considered to corroborate the validity of the
results when the proposal is executed over a real environ-
ment. Finally, Section 9 discusses the principal conclusions
and remarks on this work as well as some future research
directions.
2. Related Work
Several anomaly detection and missing data imputation
techniques for WSNs have been recently proposed. A neural
network-based anomaly detection scheme and amissing data
imputation algorithm were developed in [12]. The network
is partitioned into clusters, and the missing data algorithm
selects the nearest neighbor or the most repeated value of the
neighbors to estimate the missing value for the target sensor.
If there are no neighbors, the last value of the sensor is chosen
instead. In this case, the missing data imputation technique is
used to improve the performance of the classification process
by the neural network. Aiming at obtaining reliable health
monitoring systems, the work addressed in [13] proposes a
distributed scheme to detect and isolate those sensors whose
measurements are missing or are inaccurate. This is carried
out by using analytical redundancy taking into account the
inherent redundant information in these systems. This way,
a virtual predicted value per each observed sensor value
is computed. The virtual values are nonfaulty and will be
obtained from the measured outputs of correlated sensors
and the previously acquired system knowledge. Thus an
inconsistency value will be detected through the residuals
obtained when comparing both, virtual and observed values.
The authors in [14] introduce a data mining methodology
based on exploiting spatial-temporal relationships among
sensors in WSNs for missing data imputation. Another study
[15] addresses a robust method to recover missing data
using two temporal predictors and one spatial predictor.
The algorithm selects the best predictor among the three
when there are missing data, showing how sampling rate
and packet loss affect recovery accuracy. A missing data
recovery proposal using sparsity-spatial interpolation with a
fixed Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) basis is addressed in
[16]. Another study further proposes a sparsity-basedmissing
data recoverymethod [17] to enhance the previous work. Ref-
erence [18] develops a novel anomaly detection and missing
data imputation technique using dynamic Bayesian networks
to exploit spatial and temporal correlation among samples.
If there is a discrepancy between the normality model (data
calibration-based model) and the actual sensor value, an
anomaly alarm is triggered. The imputation or recovery
method is then addressed by inferring the most likely sensor
value from both the current and immediate past values. As in
the previous work, the authors in [19] consider the inherent
spatial and temporal correlation commonly exhibited in this
type of networks. The work proposes a nearest neighbor
(NN) missing data imputation scheme through the use of
𝑘-𝑑 trees. They are built by considering weighted variances
and weighted Euclidean distances obtained from measured
percentages ofmissing data.Theirmissing dataNNalgorithm
will use the nearest neighbors found in 𝑘-𝑑 tree traversal
to impute the lost sensor value. Reference [20] addresses
the distributed 𝐻
∞
filtering problem in sensor networks in
presence ofmissing data. Each sensor is provided by a specific
filter, designed to maintain a constant prediction error and to
accomplish a predefined performance according to their own
and adjacent values.
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Although multivariate methodologies have been exten-
sively used in the literature, their application toWSNs is lim-
ited.Until now, fewworksmake use ofmultivariate analysis in
WSNs, and most of them are limited to intrusion or anomaly
detection, not data recovery. An intrusion detection system
for routing attacks based on PCA is introduced in [21]. The
authors partition the network into groups with one monitor
per group. Each monitor has two PCA models: one for its
own traffic and one for the global traffic, which is obtained
by exchanging its local PCA model with other monitors. The
authors conclude that a PCA global distributed modeling
achieves better detection performance than the centralized
modeling for sinkhole attacks (sinkhole attacks are those
in which a malicious node sends fake routing information
claiming an optimum route to make other nodes route data
packets through the malicious node to inspect and filter
the traffic). A PCA-based anomaly detection is proposed
in [22]. In that reference, the authors develop a system
with two phases: data modeling and anomaly detection. For
data modeling, two methods are discussed to improve PCA
modeling against outliers or inconsistent data. The anomaly
detection process is then performed by comparing calibra-
tion data with new incoming data using the Mahalanobis
distance.
Given the general high performance exhibited by multi-
variate techniques in several heterogeneous fields, we assess
in this paper a multivariate scheme for anomaly detection,
data loss identification, and missing data recovery using
latent variable models. When latent variable techniques are
employed, main design choices are the data arrangement and
the selection of the number of latent variables. The problem
of optimum data arrangement for multivariate modeling is
treated in a considerable number of references, covering
applications such as statistical monitoring [23], process con-
trol [24], or image processing [25]. For instance, Dynamic
PCA [26], which has raised a great interest in the scientific
community, is simply a data rearrangement process followed
by a traditional PCA modeling. Previous references show
that the data arrangement problem is a paramount topic
to incorporate dynamics, locality, and/or segmentation in
a multivariate model. It is also accepted that the optimum
arrangement is application dependent [27], so that it needs to
be carefully chosen for each particular application.This paper
addresses the data arrangement for both anomaly detection
and data recovery.
3. Multivariate Statistical Analysis
Most natural and man-made processes are multivariate sys-
tems, as their adequate characterization requires the joint
use of several variables. For instance, weather forecasting
depends on wind, atmosphere pressure, and temperature,
among many other factors.
Data description and modeling, discrimination and clas-
sification, or regression and prediction [28] are the usual
fields for applying multivariate techniques. The following
sections provide the fundamentals of multivariate statistical
analysis in the context of this work.
3.1. PCA: Principal Components Analysis. The main goal of
PCA is data compression. PCA identifies a number of linear
combinations of the original variables in a data set X, the
so-called principal components (PCs), containing most of its
relevant information (variability).This is a change of variables
from the original variables in theX space to the PCs subspace.
If X is a data matrix with 𝐽 variables associated with a
given phenomenon and 𝐼 observations of each variable, PCA
reduces its dimension from 𝐽 variables to𝐴PCs by finding the
𝐴-dimensional latent subspace of most captured variability.










is the 𝐽 × 𝐴 loading matrix, T
𝐴
is the 𝐼 × 𝐴 score
matrix, and E
𝐴
is the 𝐼 × 𝐽 residual matrix. The maximum
variance directions are obtained from the eigenvectors of
X𝑇 ⋅X, and they are ordered as the columns ofP
𝐴
by explained
variance. The rows of T
𝐴
are the projections of the original
𝐼 observations in the new latent subspace. E
𝐴
is the matrix
that contains the residual error, and it plays a crucial role
in anomaly detection, as shown afterwards. The projection
(score) on the PCA subspace of a new observation is obtained
as follows:
tnew = xnew ⋅P𝐴, (2)
where xnew is a 1 × 𝐽 vector representing a new object and
tnew is a 1 × 𝐴 vector representing its projection to the latent
subspace.
The number of PCs in a model, 𝐴, can be selected
using several methods, including cross-validation [29, 30].
Section 3.3 introduces this method.
3.2. PLS: Partial Least Squares. Another relevant problem in
multivariate analysis is data regression, where two data sets
are involved, X and Y, where X is the 𝐼 × 𝐽 measurement
matrix used to predict Y (𝐼 ×𝑀).
To predict Y, a model B containing the regression
relationship between both data setsX andY is first estimated.
New Y values can then be predicted from the new X
measures. The linear regression problem is defined by the
expression
Y = X ⋅B+ F. (3)
The least squares solution for (3) is
B̂ = (X𝑇 ⋅X)
−1
⋅X𝑇 ⋅Y. (4)
This solution cannot be computed if matrix X𝑇 ⋅ X is
singular. It is also highly unstable when a high correlation
exists among variables in X. To overcome this limitation,
the PLS method applies the latent PCA subspace idea to
the regression problem. In this case, the variables in X are
transformed to a reduced set of latent variables thatmaximize
the covariance between X and Y.
The partial linear regression problem between normal-
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where T
𝐴




are the 𝐽 × 𝐴




are the 𝐼 × 𝐽 and
𝐼 ×𝑀 residual matrices of X and Y, respectively.
The regression coefficients of the PLS model are finally
established as





whereW is a 𝐽 × 𝐴 matrix of weights, such that T = X ⋅W ⋅
(P𝑇 ⋅W)−1. A PLS model is thus represented by matrices P,
W, andQ.
Finally, a new observation with the PLS model is esti-
mated as
ŷnew = xnew ⋅ B̂PLS, (7)
where xnew is a 1×𝐽 vector representing a new object and ŷnew
is a 1 × 𝑀 vector representing the estimation of the output
variables.
The number of dimensions of the latent subspace, 𝐴, can
be also estimated through cross-validation.
3.3. Selection of the Number of Latent Variables: Cross-
Validation. The prediction ability of a model is related to its
capacity to estimate new data previously unseen during the
calibration (or training) phase. The usual way to assess the
prediction performance of a model is using a validation set
[28]. In a validation set, different data than those used in
the calibration process are considered. The so-called cross-
validation procedure is a good validation option when the
number of observations in a given data set is small.
The central idea in cross-validation is to divide the avail-
able observations into 𝐺 groups and compute the prediction
errors for each of them. In each iteration, the calibration
model is obtained from 𝐺 − 1 groups, while the remaining
group is predicted from the model and the corresponding
prediction error is computed. This process is repeated for all
groups, and the total error is obtained for the resulting 𝐺
combinations.
Wold [29] proposed the use of cross-validation to deter-
mine the number of PCs in PCA. The prediction error (typi-
cally Prediction Error Sum of Squares, or PRESS) obtained in
the cross-validation process is computed when the number of
PCs equals one, two, and so on. Finally, the number of PCs is
selected from the PRESS shape.
Cross-validation can be directly applied to PLS models.
However, this is not possible for PCA models because the
notion of prediction error in PCA is ill defined. This is
because PCA models are not prediction models, and a pre-
diction procedure can not be univocally stated.The authors in
[31] conclude that the element-wise k-fold (ekf) algorithm is a
valid choice for PCA cross-validation when themodel is used
formissing data imputation purposes, as in the present paper.
See the Appendix for a brief explanation of the ekf algorithm.
3.4. Multivariate Statistical Process Control. One of the most
extended applications of PCA and PLS is process monitoring
and anomaly detection and diagnosis, often referred to as
multivariate statistical process control (MSPC). In a MSPC
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Figure 1: X data set arrangement, conformed by 𝐼 = 431 obser-
vations of 𝐽 = 61 variables each from the LUCE experiment
deployment.
system, 𝑄 and 𝑇2 [32] statistics are commonly used. 𝑄
compresses the residuals in each observation, and 𝑇2 is
computed from the scores. With both statistics computed
from the calibration data under normal conditions, control
limits can be established with a certain confidence level. New
data are then monitored using these limits. An anomaly is
identified when the limits are exceeded. Furthermore, the
contribution of the variables to a detected anomaly can be
investigated with the contribution plots [33].
The 𝑄 and 𝑇2 statistics for a specific observation can be































represents the score of the 𝑖th observation of




stand for the mean and
standard deviation for the scores of that variable in the
calibration data, respectively, and 𝑒
𝑖𝑗
represents the residual
value corresponding to the 𝑖th observation of the 𝑗th variable.
Note that the optimum number of latent variables in the
prediction sense does not necessarily match the optimum
number for process monitoring [30].
3.5. Suitability Multivariate Techniques in WSNs. A WSN is
composed of a set of strategically distributed sensors for
gathering some kind of sensed data at a specific sampling
rate. Data are then processed for heterogeneous purposes like
monitoring or tracking. This way, the information gathered
from aWSN could be seen as a set of 𝐽 variables, the sensors,
and a set of 𝐼 observations, the sensed data at each sampling
time.This information has a suitable form to be analyzedwith
multivariate methods. Besides, multivariate techniques work
well with correlated data, a common characteristic in WSN.
To briefly justify the use of multivariate techniques in WSNs,
we will use a real WSN data set obtained from the LUCE
(Lausanne Urban Canopy Experiment) (LUCE deployment
data set at http://lcav.epfl.ch/page-86035-en.html) project.
More detailed explanation about LUCE deployment and the
devised experiments will be detailed in Section 8. Figure 1
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Figure 2: Residual variance obtained through the PCAmodeling in
the LUCE experiment as the number of PCs is increased.
illustrates the LUCE data set arrangement to conform the X
calibration set considering 61 sensors and 431 time observa-
tions of each.
As mentioned above, the information gathered from a
WSN is highly correlated and, therefore, is adequate to be
analyzed withmultivariatemethods. To verify that statement,
the intervariable correlation was computed in the LUCE data
set, and aminimum correlation coefficient of 0.89 was found.
In Figure 2, the residual variance obtained from the PCA
model of the real data set in terms of the number of PCs
is shown. As a consequence of the high correlation among
variables, PCA is able to capture almost all data variability by
using only one PC: 97% of the explained variance is obtained
while the residual variance is around 3%. In summary, this
simple experiment illustrates the suitability of multivariate
techniques in WSNs.
4. Missing Data Recovery
There are several methods and proposals to estimate missing
data with PCA. These methods can be classified into two
groups: regression and non-regression-based methods, the
former ones exhibiting better performance [10]. Among the
regression-based techniques, the trimmed scores regression
presents a good trade-off between simplicity and estimation
performance [11].
The trimmed scores regression (TSR) method estimates
the value of the scores from the trimmed scores, that is, the
scores obtained by filling the missing values with zeros. For
data centered before PCA, this is equivalent to using the
average value of a variable to give an initial estimation of its
missing values.
Without loss of generality, let us assume an incomplete
observation 𝑥inc with available measurements on the first 𝑘
variables and where the values of the remaining variables are











































is the loading corresponding to the 𝑗th variable
in the 𝑎th PC. Only the available variables in 𝑥inc and
their corresponding loadings are thus used to compute the
trimmed scores.
The calibration data in X can be used to improve the
estimation of the scores from incomplete observations. Let
us call X∗ the submatrix of X with the available variables
in 𝑥inc. The matrix of trimmed scores corresponding to the
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where the matrix of regression coefficients B may be com-







typically nicely conditioned. If it is not, PLS or other biased
methods can be used to estimate B. Afterward, B is used to






⋅B)𝑇 ⋅ 𝑥∗inc. (14)
Finally, the score 𝜏TSR
𝐴
can be used to estimate the







TSR ismore efficient as the intervariable correlation in the
original data set increases, since variables with missing data
for a given observation are computed from available values in
others.
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used in the inversion in (17).The information of the complete
model is used, improving prediction capability. Moreover,
inversion problems are avoided.
For the sake of clarification, a graphical illustration of the
missing data recoverymethod proposed is shown in Figure 3.
Note that this procedure is based on the use of PCA models,
though considering PLS models does not change the main
methodology.
The recovery procedure is activated when an altered
observation is detected. A missing data is determined
through a previously established monitoring system (that
procedure will be detailed in Section 6.2). Although the
process is self-explanatory (𝑇3 and 𝑇5 values are missed and
thus they are recovered and substituted by 𝑅3 and 𝑅5, resp.),
two are the main aspects to remark here: (i) the imputation
method only considers the available information to estimate
the scores and (ii) the system is able to get an estimation of
the original observation by applying the complete calibration
PCA model.
5. Data Arrangement for System Modeling
It should be noted that the data arrangement procedure
has a significant impact on the performance of a multivari-
ate model. Furthermore, the suitability of one or another
arrangement depends on the purpose of themodeling process
itself [34].
As alreadymentioned and it will be evidenced in Sections
6 and 7, the proposed multivariate approach is applied to
both detect anomalies and identify and recover data loss.
A different data arrangement to generate the multivariate
model is proposed for the monitoring and recovery systems,
as the particular conditions and requirements differ. The
rest of the section discusses a global model to be used for
detection purposes and a local model for data recovery.
Though the application of the global model for data recovery
is also discussed, the local models are shown to yield a better
performance.
5.1. Monitoring: Global Modeling. We define a global model
as a PCA model calibrated from the data gathered by the
WSN arranged in matrix form as follows: we arrange the data
corresponding to each single sensor as a column and the data
corresponding to each single measurement interval as a row.
Thus, the matrix of data X from which PCA is calibrated
contains 𝐽 variables, with 𝐽 being the number of sensors in
the WSN, and 𝐼 observations, with 𝐼 being the number of
sampling times.
Figure 4 depicts the data arrangement for a hypothetical
area network with 81 sensors in total and 100 time observa-
tions of each of them. In this case, the corresponding model
refers to a matrix X of dimension 100 × 81.
It is important to note that the actual location of a sensor
in the data arrangement does not have any influence in terms
of model calibration, monitoring, or data recovery.
5.2. Data Recovery: Local Modeling. Regarding the subse-
quent recovery procedure, TSR aims to restore the values
affected by an attack or a sensor failure. This method, as
mentioned before in Section 4, tries to impute the missing
values through the available sensormeasurements, so that the
imputation accuracy increases as there exist more available
unaffected values and they are correlated with the affected
ones. Because of this last condition for TSR, the global
modeling previously introduced is expected not to provide
an optimal arrangement to derive our model, as not all
the data values in the network area are correlated. For
this reason, a different arrangement of the WSN data for
missing data recovery is proposed. We consider in this case
only the sensors located in the vicinity area surrounding an
attacked sensor. The PCA or PLS model calibrated from this
arrangement of the data is referred to as a local model. We
will see how this affects the recovery performance in Sections
6.3 and 7.
A main concern in the calibration of local models is
how to arrange the data when the sensors are not regularly
distributed in the sensor field. Figures 5 and 6 depict the
arrangement process to build up a local model for PCA and
PLS for regular and nonregular topologies, respectively. In
both cases, the vicinity of a given sensor is defined by its
closest neighbor sensors (in Figures 5 and 6, eight neighbors
are considered). Each neighbor is represented by an arrow
indicating the relative position to the affected sensor for
the regular topology and by an identifier in the nonregular
topology case (they are numbered in order of distance, from
the closest one, 1, to the farthest one, 8). We discuss in
Section 8.3 how a value other than 8 for the vicinity affects
the recovery results.
Ameasure of each target sensor and its neighbors (i.e., the
locality is 9-dimensional) is acquired every sampling time,
which constitutes an observation in the local model. For a
regular network, we only consider the (𝐾− 2) × (𝐾− 2) inner
sensors to build the local model. Thus, X is 𝐼 ⋅ (𝐾 − 2)2 × 9-
dimensional. On the other hand, for nonregular network,
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Figure 5: Local model for a regular topology of the sensor field. The locality illustrated is established to 9 sensors, so that the total number
of observations is 𝐼 × (𝐾 − 2)2, where 𝐼 is the number of original observations and 𝐾 is the number of sensors per side, (𝐾 − 2)2 being the
number of sensors considered. In this structure 𝑧 corresponds to the last sensor value at the 𝐼th original observation.
defining locality or vicinity is not a trivial task. The following
procedure is proposed for that, where we consider that the
position of each sensor is known or at least estimated with a
certain accuracy:
(i) For a given sensor, its 8 closest neighbor nodes are
obtained using the Euclidean distance (Figure 6).
(ii) To conform the local model, each 9-dimensional
observation is obtained by combining the value of the
target sensor with those of its 8 closest neighbors. It
is important to note at this point that the neighbors
are arranged in a specific order. For instance, in PCA
the value of the target sensor is inserted between the
nearest four and the farthest four sensors, thus con-
forming the matrix X. The order is not relevant itself
but all the observations should follow the same order.
In the PLS case, there exist two separate matrices, X
andY.The first one contains all the variables (sensors)
except the target one, which is located in theYmatrix
and whose values are estimated by using X.
In order to clarify the local model building, take the case
in which we have 𝐽 = 81 sensors, 𝐼 = 100 observations of
each of them, and 𝐾 = 9 sensors per side corresponding
to the regular sensor field. Figures 7(a) and 7(b) specify
the new locality-based arrangement resulting for PCA and
PLS, respectively. As indicated, we make use of 9 sensors
(the affected one and its 8 closest neighbors) and 𝐼 = 100
observations. Therefore, we have (𝐾 − 2)2 = 49 inner sensors
and the dimension of the local model is 4900 × 9 for PCA,
being 4900 × 8 in X and 4900 × 1 in Y for PLS.
6. Simulation Scenario:
Regular Sensor Network
In most WSN-related environments, the CU gathers and
analyzes the measurements generated by the sensors over
time. The present work is focused on data collected this
way for a critical environment like military actions, crisis
management, or disaster recovery [2]. In particular, we focus
our study on a fire fighting scenario in a forestry area.
The main reason for this choice is the social and economic
relevance of this kind of environments at present. Using this
simulated environment, normal temperature conditions and
fire situations will be simulated, as well as several specific
data tampering attacks. Upon such a scenario, an anomaly
detection system based on multivariate analysis is used to
alert a human supervisor when an anomaly occurs. This
supervisor is in charge or discerning between actual fire situa-
tions and malicious attacks, aided by the visualizations in the
multivariate monitoring system. If an attack is determined,




















Values to be estimated















1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
5 6 987
1 2 3 4 6 7 598
1 2 3 4 5 6 87
5 6 87
1 2 3 4 5 6 87
1 2 3 4 5 6 87
1 2 3 4 5 6 87





Figure 6: Local model for data arrangement for a nonregular topology of the sensor field. The locality is established to 9 sensors, so that
the total number of observations is 𝐼 × 𝐽, where 𝐼 is the number of original observations and 𝐽 is the number of sensors. In this figure 𝑚
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Figure 7: Local model arrangement for (a) PCA and (b) PLS from the global model shown in Figure 4 in which there exist 𝐼 = 100
observations, 𝐽 = 81 sensors, and 𝐾 = 9 sensors per side in the regular sensor field.
a subsequent recovery process is launched to restore the
original sensor values affected by the attack.
We will analyze the effects of the attack, the performance
of our recovery scheme, and how they depend on the specific
routing algorithm implemented in the network.
6.1. Framework Description. SomeWSN simulation tools are
useful for experimentation [35]. However, most tools mainly
focus on network features (e.g., physical layer, protocols, and
propagation models) and usually ignore the environmental
situation and real physical magnitudes. For this work we
have developed a specific simulator based on Matlab 2009b
to obtain the temperature evolution of a forestry area. It
is inspired by [36], where the authors present a model
in which the temperature obtained by a given sensor is
calculated by including the contribution of close fire focuses.
A fire focus is modeled using a 2D Gaussian distribution,
which is used to simulate the temperature acquired by a
sensor under normal conditions and under a fire situation.
Figure 8 shows the simulation scenario, where Figure 8(a)
corresponds to the distribution of the sensors in the area.
Two types of temperature maps are also presented. Derived
from normal conditions, Figure 8(b) shows three normal
temperature (in ∘C) sources representing the hottest areas,
which may be valleys, among cooler zones representing
mountains. Figure 8(c) illustrates a fire situation where the
fire has a central focus covering more than half of the total
area.
We assume a 1000m × 1000m square area of forestry
where 81 (9 × 9) sensors are regularly distributed; that is,
each sensor is located ∼100m away from its neighbors
(Figure 8(a)). Every sensor acquires the ambient temperature
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 9


























































Figure 8: Simulation scenario: (a) sensor locations, (b) temperaturemap under normal conditions, and (c) temperaturemapwith a fire focus.
for predefined sampling times and sends the measurements
to the CU. The proposed deployment for the measurements
is inspired in a real system provided by Libelium company
(http://www.libelium.com/wireless sensor networks to
detec forest fires/).
The simulation tool is first employed to generate a data
set used to calibrate a PCA model (hereafter, CAL data set).
The data matrix X contains 100 observations of 81 variables
(the temperatures obtained by each sensor) under normal
temperature conditions, that is, without a fire situation. A
situation in which a fire focus evolves over time is then
simulated (hereafter, FIR data set). These data sets are used
to study the detection capabilities of our anomaly detection
system.
To evaluate the capacity of the PCA-based model against
certain attacks, three variants of a data tampering scenario are
simulated (hereafter, ATA data set).They differ in the specific
routing algorithm considered in sending the sensor data to
the CU. First, a direct communication between each sensor
and the CU is assumed using the general packet radio service
(GPRS). In this case, the tampering of a sensor only affects
the measurements collected by that sensor. This situation
corresponds to what is hereafter called an isolated attack,
illustrated in the upper left part of Figure 9. Second, a more
severe attack can occur in a multihop routing scheme, where
just attacking a single sensor would affect all previous sensors
in the route.The bottom part of Figure 9 illustrates this attack
for a linear (left-to-right) routing scheme, which is inspired in
the MCFA routing protocol [1]. This is hereafter referred to
as the line attack. More sophisticated routing schemes may
be also considered for WSNs. LEACH [1] is a well-known
routing algorithmdesigned to reduce energy consumption by
arranging the sensors in clusters, so that the so-called cluster
head (CH) performs data aggregation prior to sending the
collected data to the CU. Figure 10 depicts a scenario in which
a CH is compromised, affecting all the sensed values in the
cluster.This is hereafter referred to as the cluster attack. Notice
that although the names isolated, line, and cluster attack are






Figure 9: A malicious node modifies the values of a single sensor,
which can affect the values corresponding to one (isolated data






Figure 10: A malicious node modifies other sensor values during
the data aggregation process (cluster attack).
used for the sake of easy understanding, in all the cases we
consider that a single sensor is being tampered. Thus, they
should not be understood as different variants of a tampering
attack but as different consequences of the same attack due to
the routing scheme being used in the WSN.
Each tampering scenario variant considered (i.e. isolated,
line, and cluster) is introduced in a separated test set where
the evolution of a fire is simulated over time. The goal of
the validation study performed is twofold: (a) to analyze the
capability of the proposed PCA-based system to determine
the occurrence of tampering attacks and (b) to be able
to recover tampered data in order to restore the normal
functioning of the environment and to enable the correct
operation of the fire brigades for optimal positioning and
strategy making.






















































Figure 11: Monitoring graphic: initial calibration data (dark circles)
and control limits (dashed lines), fromwhich anomalies are detected
(inverted triangles). 𝑄 contribution plot detailing anomalous spe-
cific observation (top left).
6.2. Monitoring and Anomaly Detection. We use the PLS-
toolbox in the Matlab environment [37] to illustrate the
proposed approach forWSNmonitoring. Firstly, the number
of PCs has to be selected in PCA.There is no perfect solution
to determine the number of PCs when the model is used for
monitoring [30]. The inspection of the eigenvalues showed
that 1 PC is an adequate choice. By comparing the PCA
model obtained from calibration to the new observations
under monitoring (i.e., the test data set), anomalies in the
environmental behavior are detected. This detection is per-
formed throughmonitoring graphics such as those presented
in Figure 11, in which the 𝑇2 statistic is the abscissa and
the 𝑄 statistic the ordinate. Each sampling time, a new
observation is collected from the WSN and the scores are
computed (see (2)) and the statistics 𝑇2 and 𝑄 obtained
(see (8) and (9), resp.). A point in the plot represents one
sampling time in the WSN. The Figure 11 points out the
sampling times corresponding to the fire evolution (inverted
triangles) in the ATA data set as anomalous events, because
they differ from those corresponding to normal conditions
(dark circles) in the CAL data set. The monitoring system
automatically triggers an alarmwhen themonitored behavior
deviates from the normal operating conditions established
from the calibration data.This occurs when the control limits
of the statistics are exceeded for three consecutive sampling
times (three consecutive sampling times are commonly used
in typical multivariate statistical process control (MSPC)
deployments). In the system proposed, the control limits are
chosen such that 95% of the observations gathered in the
calibration stage fall below the limits. This means that the
theoretical probability for false positives is 0,053 = 0,000125.
According to Figure 11, the monitoring system can detect the
fire situation (inverted triangles) from the beginning of its
evolution.




















Figure 12: 𝑄 contribution plot for a fire situation (FIR data set).
It is also important to remark that at this point the
monitoring system is not capable of automatically distin-
guishing between actual anomalies, such as fire events, and
false alarms caused by a potential tampering attack or a sensor
malfunction. In other typical PCA/PLS monitoring schemes,
such as in industrial process monitoring [33], there exists a
human supervisor who distinguishes between real anomalies
and false alarms. To aid this supervisor, contribution plots are
issued after an alarm is triggered. We inherit this approach in
our proposal.
Figure 12 shows the typical pattern for the𝑄 contribution
in the fire case, while Figures 15(a), 15(c), and 15(e) show
the patterns obtained under attack (isolated, line, and cluster,
resp.) in the same fire scenario. The tampering attacks are
shown as sharp artifacts which depend on the routing scheme
and which are clearly different to the smooth contribution of
a true fire.
Although the human intervention can be seen as a
shortcoming of the proposed approach, the relevance of fire
detection requires such an intervention in a practical system.
The automation of the distinction between real anomalies
and false alarms is out of the scope of this paper. However,
a tentative approach is illustrated here inspired in filtering
methods of image processing [38]. Filtering methods can be
used to highlight specific artifacts in a plot. Thus, they can
be used to highlight the artifact generated by a tampering
attack for a given routing. For instance, if a line routing
scheme is being used, a filtering window to detect lines can be
employed, as shown in Figure 13. Once the filtering window
is applied to the contribution plot, we can see a considerable
accentuation of the line affected by the attack. Afterwards, a
threshold can be established to distinguish between artifacts
and actual anomalies.
Whatever the detection method, either manual or auto-
matic, used to determine the occurrence of false alarms due
to tampering ormalfunction, a missing data recovery process
is afterwards executed to solve the situation and recover the





















Figure 13: 𝑄 contribution plot after a window filtering process
for the line tampering attack shown in Figure 15(c). This filter
accentuates the attack for a subsequent threshold-based automatic
detection. The line sensor accentuated by the filtering process is
highlighted by a dashed circle.













Figure 14: Cross-validation PRESS curve for the simulated data set
considering the global model.
6.3. Missing Data Recovery. After an attack detection alarm,
a response mechanism should be performed to mitigate
the consequences of the threat and achieve the system
survivability. A main contribution of the present work is to
treat the detected “fraudulent” values as missing values and
estimate them using missing data recovery techniques.
First of all, the global model used for monitoring will be
employed for data recovery. To select the optimal number
of PCs, we use the cross-validation method mentioned in
Section 3.3 and the PRESS shape. Figure 14 shows that 3 PCs
seems to be an adequate number of PCs, since the PRESS
attains its minimum value for that number. This number
12 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Table 1:MSE comparison for different tampering attacks usingTSR-
PCA as missing data imputation method.




agrees with the fact that the CAL data set has exactly three
variability sources, corresponding to the temperature focuses.
Once we got the optimal number of PCs for our specific
CAL data set, we can evaluate in optimal conditions the
TSR-PCA missing data imputation method for the three
mentioned data tampering cases: isolated, line, and cluster.
Figures 15(b), 15(d), and 15(f) represent the result of each
corresponding attack after the data recovery process. The
𝑄 contribution is smoother after data recovery than the
original cases in Figures 15(a), 15(c), and 15(e). However, the
results are far from being optimum. The 𝑄 contribution for
distant sensors from the fire is lower than that for closer
sensors, in which a greater 𝑄 contribution is exhibited. This
is because we have estimated the PCA model for normal
conditions (without fire), while data tampering experiments
are performed under fire circumstances. The recovery from
data tampering attacks in distant locations from the fire is
more effective. Such circumstance can be observed in Figures
15(d) and 15(f), where the values of the sensors closer to the
fire focus are not correctly restored.
Beyond the visual-based results, Table 1 shows numerical
results of the recovery using the mean squared error (MSE)
between actual and restored data. To avoid the aforemen-
tioned sensors location influence on the results, we calculate
the average MSE value for all sensors in the 9 × 9 network.
This is performed by repeating each of the tampering cases
(isolated, line, and cluster) so that each of the 9 × 9 sensors in
the network is tampered and recovered once.
The isolated data tampering has the lower MSE because
the recovery method has more available valid data to recover
the sensor values affected by the attack. The worst case
corresponds to the cluster attack, where most sensors in the
neighborhood of the tampered one are also affected and can
not be used in the recovery. In the line case, each tampered
sensor has at least one sensor below and above it with valid
data to allow a better recovery than in the cluster case. In
summary, the routing algorithm is a key aspect to consider in
this problem. Although an aggregation algorithm is a good
choice from an energetic perspective, it may be not from a
security perspective using imputation methods.
In order to complete the previous results we also study
the evolution of the MSE as a function of the fire progress
as well as of the number of tampered sensors. The results
are presented in Figures 16 and 17, respectively. In the first
one, we depict the MSE evolution for the 10 first sampling
times from the beginning of the fire. We can observe a clear
incremental evolution of the MSE. Also, in accordance with
the results in Table 1, the isolated attack presents the lowest
MSE trend while the cluster attack doubles this trend. In
Figure 17, we show the MSE evolution with the number of
Table 2: MSE for local model-based TSR-PCA and TSR-PLS
missing data imputation methods.




tampered sensors in the isolated case inwhich the numbers of
tampered and affected sensorsmatch.The results are obtained
by randomly tampering from 1 to 10 sensors. We can see
an increasing MSE evolution with the number of sensors
tampered. This increasing behavior is the consequence of
randomly selecting adjacent sensors, so that the missing data
imputation technique has less available sensor values to infer
the original values of the tampered sensors. Still, the tendency
shows a linear profile with lowmultiplicative constant, so that
the increase in the number of tampered sensors sevenfold
only doubles the MSE.
7. Improving the Missing Data Recovery
Performance: Local Modeling Approach
Instead of using all sensors for data imputation as in the
case of the global model presented in Section 5.1, the local
modeling approach is used in this section (see Section 5.2 for
details) where only the sensors closest to the affected one are
considered to recover the missing values. The local model is
only used for imputation, not for monitoring purposes where
the global model is still considered. Two models are thus
involved: the global model for data monitoring and a local
model for data imputation.
The optimum number of PCs for a local model must be
estimated again as it was in Section 6.3 for global modeling.
According to Figure 18, the lowest PRESS value is obtained
for 7 PCs in both PCA and PLS cases.
To compare the recovery results obtained by using global
and local models, the MSE and 𝑄 contribution plots are
obtained. Figure 19(b) shows the 𝑄 contribution after data
recovery for the isolated attack. It clearly outperforms the
imputation provided by the global model in Figure 15(b),
and it resembles with high fidelity the case in which no
attack exists (Figure 19(a)). A similar conclusion is obtained
from the MSE values in Table 2. Analogous results and
conclusions can be extracted for line and cluster attacks in
Figures 19(c) and 19(d), respectively. The same occurs with
the corresponding MSE values in Table 2.
In summary, results in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the
benefits of using local versus global modeling for data impu-
tation.The new arrangementmethod can significantly reduce
all MSE values. In the isolated case, a reduction of 99.86%
is achieved, while the reduction is 97.25% in the line case
and 96.61% in the cluster case. Both TSR-PLS and TSR-PCA
missing data imputation methods provide similar results
because the number of latent variables is chosen in both
cases using the same method: cross-validation (Section 3.3).

























































































































Figure 15: Simulated data tampering: (a) profile generated from the fire situation in Figure 12 and an isolated attack and (b) recovery results
after the imputation process; (c) profile generated from the fire situation in Figure 12 and a line attack and (d) recovery results after the
imputation process; (e) profile generated from the fire situation in Figure 12 and a 3 × 3 cluster group affected by the attack and (f) recovery
results after the imputation process. In each figure, those sensors affected by the associated attack are highlighted with a dashed circle.
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Figure 16: Evolution of MSE for the 10 first sampling times with
the presence of fire considering global models and for each data
tampering case (isolated, line, and cluster).
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Figure 17: Evolution of MSE with the presence of fire considering
several tampered sensors for global models by using the isolated
routing strategy.
Thus, they are working in optimal conditions formissing data
imputation.
We also explore the evolution of the MSE as the fire
evolves in Figure 20 in a similar manner to Figure 16 for the
global model case. In addition to the incremental evolution
of the MSE value observed again, the improvement provided
in the estimation performance by local models is clear. This
behavior can be explained by the fact that the global model
is more sensible to fire. That is, the sensors affected by the
fire focus are included together with those far from it in
the model, which leads to the estimation of the value of
sensors using other sensors in different conditions. In a local
model, instead, the sensors considered are limited to the















Figure 18: Cross-validation PRESS curve for the simulated data set
considering the local model. The lowest PRESS value is obtained for
7 PCs in both cases: PCA and PLS.
neighborhood, so that a sensor affected or not by fire is
estimated from sensors under the same conditions.
Finally, we study the MSE evolution as a function of the
number of tampered sensors. This is shown in Figure 21. As
in the global model case (Figure 17), the MSE grows with
the number of tampered sensors. Again, we find a linear
increasing behavior. In this case, themultiplicative constant is
higher showing that randomly chosen adjacent nodes have a
deeper impact on the localmodel performance. Still, theMSE
of local models is several orders of magnitude lower than that
of global models.
We can conclude, from the previous discussion and
results, than our proposed missing data imputation method
plus the local data arrangement leads to a high recovery
performance evenwith adverse conditions: dynamic environ-
mental changes (fire evolution) and a reasonable number of
sensors tampered (around 12% of the total). Consequently,
the proposal improves the robustness of WSNs against secu-
rity threats and so its survivability.
8. Real Scenario: LUCE (Lausanne Urban
Canopy Experiment) Deployment
In this section, a realWSN scenario is used to corroborate the
validity of the results obtained in simulation.
8.1. Sensor Deployment Description. LUCE (Lausanne Urban
Canopy Experiment) (LUCE deployment data set at http://
lcav.epfl.ch/page-86035-en.html) is a WSN project driven
at the EPFL (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
campus since July 2006. This is an innovative system that
allows for the first time studying the interactions between an
urban environment and the lower atmosphere.

















































































Figure 19: TSR-PCA data tampering imputation through local modeling: (a) original profile for the fire, (b) sensor imputation for isolated
attack, (c) sensor imputation for line attack, and (d) imputation for cluster attack. Those sensors affected by the associated attack are
highlighted with a dashed circle.
LUCE aims to better understand micrometeorology and
atmospheric transport in urban environments. The system
is based on a wireless sensor network of 100 SensorScope
weather stations that are deployed on the campus (about
500m2 area). These stations measure key environmental
quantities at high spatial and temporal resolutions.
Each SensorScope weather station has several sensors.
Among others, there are ambient temperature, humidity, and
wind speed sensors.Thesemeasures are acquired and sent for
analysis via GPRS to a CU with a periodicity of 30 seconds.
Table 3 compares the features of the simulation environ-
ment and the LUCE data set. Both have a similar deployment
area and a similar number of sensors, and both consider tem-
peraturemeasurements. Despite these similar characteristics,
they refer to two completely different scenarios, as LUCE
providesmeasurements corresponding to a real environment.
This way, we argue that LUCE constitutes a valid “test bed” to
definitively conclude the applicability of our approach.
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Figure 20: Evolution of MSE using the 10 first sampling times with the presence of fire considering local models and for each data tampering
case: (a) isolated data tampering, (b) line data tampering, and (c) cluster data tampering.
Data collected from November 2006 to May 2007, avail-
able from the LUCE project web site, are used in this paper.
We have chosen data between January 1 and January 31, 2007,
for our experiment because this corresponds to the most
complete time interval, with 80,000 ambient temperature
samples per sensor. The number of sensors used in our study
is 61. Figure 22 shows the location of these 61 sensors, spec-
ifying the latitude and longitude coordinates. Also we show
the 8 closest sensors to a given one (sensor with ID = 100).
8.2. Anomaly Detection and Data Imputation with Global
Models. The same monitoring method developed in
Section 6.2 is deployed for LUCE. The first twenty days
of the previously mentioned data range are chosen as the
calibration set to train the PCA model. The remaining days
are used for testing purposes. The daily average value is
subtracted from the data of the corresponding day to correct
for temperature drifts along days.
Figure 23 shows the calibration model, after outliers
isolation, as dark circles. After establishing the control limits,
all subsequent observations (inverted triangles) are classified
as normal, except the one in a dashed circle (top left),
which corresponds to an artificially generated anomaly for
the present work.
Note that there is no fire influence in this case. Therefore,
an anomaly could be produced either by data loss or by
a device malfunction. These anomalies, as in the WSN
simulated case, can be deduced from the 𝑄 contribution
graphics. Figure 24 shows that the 𝑄 contribution presents
a significant deviation for a specific sensor that was actually
tampered for the experiments.
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Figure 21: Evolution of MSE with the presence of fire considering






















































Figure 22: Location of the 61 sensors in the LUCE deployment
used in our experimentation. As an example, we show the 8 closest
sensors to a given one (sensor with ID = 100).
After detecting the anomaly, a TSR-PCA-based missing
data recovery method is used as a response mechanism, as
indicated in Section 6.3. Figure 25 shows the recovery results
obtained when using global modeling. Numerical (MSE)
results are also provided in the second column of Table 4.
No routing algorithm is used in the LUCE experiment, as
data from sensors are directly sent via GPRS to the CU.
8.3. Local Models for Nonregular Locations. Using local mod-
els for data imputation in regular and equally distributed sen-
sors environments is straightforward, as the 8 closest sensors
to a given one are those surrounding the latter. Defining the



















Figure 23: Monitoring graphic: initial calibration model (dark
circles), control limits (dashed lines), and subsequent observations
(inverted triangles) classified as “normal” events, except the one in





















Figure 24: Isolated tampering 𝑄 contribution. Those sensors
affected by the associated attack are highlighted with a dashed circle.
number of closest sensors in nonregular scenarios is not such
an easy task.Therefore, a method to determinate this number
is needed. To address this issue, we get the MSE values by
varying the number of closest neighbor sensors selected in
the local model to carry out the data imputation/recovery
procedure. The results obtained are depicted in Figure 26.
We can see that the optimum number of neighbor sensors
is around 6–8, while considering a higher number of sensors
provides similarMSE values. In consequence, and for the sake
of comparison with the regular scenario, we also choose the 8
closest sensors to carry out the missing data recovery process
in the real nonregular topology scenario.
Also, a remarkable aspect is the distribution of the
closest sensors around an affected one. If most of the closest
sensors are distributed in a nonhomogeneous way around
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Table 4: MSE comparison between global and local models.
Data tampering Global model Local model
MSE (TSR-PCA) MSE (TSR-PCA) MSE (TSR-PLS)





















Figure 25: Missing data recovery results applying the global model.
The sensor affected by the associated attack is highlighted with a
dashed circle.
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Figure 26: MSE evolution with the number of sensors considered
as valid values for the missing data imputation method.
the manipulated one, the prediction accuracy is expected to
be worse than in the case that they are located in a regular
way surrounding the affected one. This way, we have some
prediction uncertainty depending on two main factors: the
distance of the closest sensors to the tampered one and their
distribution around it. This should be addressed in future
works.
The data imputation results obtained for LUCE when
using local models are visually similar to those obtained in
Figure 25. Table 4 shows the associated MSE values. In this
case, similar results are obtained to those with global models,
mainly because a high spatial correlation exists in the LUCE
data set such that almost all sensors are highly correlated.
To corroborate the existence of this high correlation, we
calculated the correlation coefficients between variables, 0.89
being the minimum value found.
Another interesting experiment may be useful to assess
the robustness of the imputation approach when more than
one sensor is compromised. We sequentially increase the
number of tampered sensors from a selected one to its
closest 8 sensors. For example, 1 means that only a sensor
is tampered, the selected sensor, 2 means that we tamper
the specific one and its closest neighbor, and so on until 9
sensors in total. Figure 27 illustrates the evolution of theMSE
parameter with the number of tampered sensors. The MSE
value does not vary significantly when the number of affected
nodes is lower than or equal to 7.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper introduces the use of multivariate analysis tech-
niques for anomaly detection and data loss/modification
identification and recovery in wireless sensor environments.
Both multivariate proposals, that is, anomaly detection and
data imputation, are tested using a temperature-related
experimental study that considers simulated and real envi-
ronments.
As an additional contribution, we have shown that dif-
ferent routing algorithms may amplify the harm of the data
loss in a different way. In particular, by properly selecting
the routing algorithm, data loss due to a tampering attack or
sensor malfunction can be better detected and lost data can
be better recovered.
Two types ofmodels for data recovery are assessed: global
and localmodels.The latter achieve better performance when
a higher correlation exists between sensor values in the
neighborhood of a given affected/attacked node.
The promising results obtained suggest extending the
study to other types of attacks, including dropping or delay
attacks, and exploiting the temporal correlation among mea-
surements. Moreover, as the routing algorithm influences
missing data recovery results, the design of efficient routing
algorithms to preserve the network correlation information is
also an interesting future research line. Another relevant issue
is that of potentially faking the node location information.
The proposed data recovery process relies on neighborhood
information, while the actual vicinity of such nodes is not
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 19































Figure 27: MSE evolution with the number of tampered sensors: (a) 9 tampered sensors; (b) zoom for only the first 7 tampered sensors.
for each PC (𝐴 = 1, . . . , 𝐴max) do
for For each group of objects (𝐺 = 1, . . . , 𝐺tot) do
Form X
∗
with data from all groups but 𝐺
Form X# with data from 𝐺






for each group of variables (𝐻 = 1, . . . , 𝐻tot) do
Set X#,𝐻 = 0
X̂# = TSR(X∗,X#)
Restore its actual value to X#,𝐻
E𝐴
𝐺,𝐻















Algorithm 1: Element-wise 𝑘-fold (ekf) algorithm.
checked. In future versions of our scheme this aspect should
be also addressed.
Appendix
Cross-Validation in PCA Models with the
Element-Wise 𝑘-Fold (ekf) Algorithm
The ekf method is specified in Algorithm 1. The core of the
algorithm performs the recovery of missing values using
TSR [31], the output of the algorithm being the matrix of
prediction errors E𝐴 (with elements 𝑒𝐴
𝑛,𝑚
in the 𝑛th row and
𝑚th column) and the PRESS computed for 𝐴 = 1, . . . , 𝐴max
PCs.
For the sake of easy understanding, the algorithm is
shown with three nested loops. The inner loop iterates
through the (groups of) variables (i.e., sensors in our case,
organized in columns). The first and second loops iterate
through the number of PCs and the (groups of) observations
(i.e., sampling time sensor values, organized in rows).
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